C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003989

SIPDIS

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TAGS: MARR MCAP PARM TU
SUBJECT: CHARTING A WAY FORWARD ON US-TU MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

Classified By: (U) Classified by PMA Counselor Tim Betts, reason 1.4, b /d.

¶1. (C) Summary: At the July 8 Missile Defense Technical Experts Group meeting in Ankara, the US and Turkey agreed that the completion of the joint architectural study of Turkey called for a new look at bilateral cooperation in the area of missile defense. The two sides agreed to three new studies -- a sensor placement study to identify optimal locations in Turkey for a forward deployed sensors; a Post Engagement Ground Effects Model Study; and a revised upper layer analysis based on updated THAAD information. The GOT was reluctant to agree at the outset to all aspects of a sensor placement study out of concern that the study could duplicate or contradict what is being done in NATO's Missile Defense Feasibility Study. To help address this concern it was decided to facilitate a dialogue with the NATO team that manages the study, The two sides agreed to pursue the amendment of the MOU to allow for the new studies and tentatively planned to hold the next full TEG in January ¶2005. End Summary.

¶2. (C) On July 8 a Missile Defense Technical Experts Group (TEG) meeting was held in Ankara with the intention of agreeing upon future cooperation in the area of missile defense. The Turkish side was led by Turkish General Staff (TGS) Scientific Decision Support Center (SDSC) Chief BG Pekar, supported by TU Air Force J-5 BG Unal (Pekar's predecessor once removed), SDSC project coordinator CPT (Air Force) Osman Iyde, LTC Unal from TGS/J-5, MFA NATO/EU Armaments and Defense Expert Muzaffer Akyildirim among others. The US side was led by Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Dr. David Martin. Both sides voiced their appreciation for the bilateral cooperation dating back several years, when the TEG was initiated as an outgrowth of the High Level Defense Group (HLDG). Since then the cooperation had taken on a life of its own and benefited both sides through the completion of the 3-phase joint architectural study of missile defense for Turkey.

¶3. (C) The TEG agreed that near term future work should include:
- a sensor placement study to identify optimal locations in Turkey for a forward deployed sensors;
- a Post Engagement Ground Effects Model Study;
- a revised upper layer analysis based on updated THAAD information.

¶4. (C) MDA reminded the TEG that DASD Ian Brzezinski noted during his visit two years before that interceptors for the defense of Europe would likely need support from forward deployed sensors, probably located in Turkey's general region. The US had already received approval to upgrade radars in Thule, Greenland and the UK that would help to defend North America and western Europe, but a more eastern sensor would provide better tracking data and also be necessary to help defend NATO's easternmost regions. For this reason, Dr. Martin urged the Turkish side to approve the sensor study, amend the MOU and begin the study soon.

¶5. (C) The Turkish side asked extensive questions on how the sensor study would fit into NATO's ongoing feasibility study. Despite MDA's assurances that the NATO study would not go into detail on the actual placement of forward deployed sensors, the Turks expressed concern about duplicative and/or overlapping work on issues already being pursued in Brussels. They noted Turkey does not have the resources to support duplicative studies. MDA emphasized that appropriate briefings on the US-TU study could be fed into the NATO study. Dr. Martin suggested a joint contribution of a US-purchased sensor supported by Turkish infrastructure would be an excellent contribution to the NATO MD force structure. He argued that the study should be completed in order to explore that possibility. The Turks questioned whether sensors and interceptors would be a commonly funded or national expense. MDA explained that currently the NATO plan is that interceptors would be nationally funded; nations might also make sensors available to NATO, but there will be the alternative (not yet guaranteed) of common funding for sensors. Such common funding would have to compete with other NATO funding priorities. MDA assured the GOT that doing the sensor study would not commit the GOT to hosting a sensor. The Turks, reluctantly it seemed, agreed to the sensor study.

¶6. (C) MDA also briefed the Turks on the Post Engagement Ground Effects Model (PEGEM), noting that the program was designed to predict and evaluate, not manage, the consequences of leaked missiles. The GOT had expressed interest at the May 2003 TEG in doing a PEGEM study on the missile leakage allowed by the joint architectural analysis.

¶7. (C) The TEG agreed that a revised upper layer analysis would be useful given new information on THAAD since the conclusion of the joint architectural study. It would provide better background relevant for the sensor study.

¶8. (C) MDA planned to provide TGS within six weeks a draft MOU amendment with the goal of finalization of the amendment by October 1. With that timeline, the sensor placement study would be complete at approximately the same time as the NATO study.

¶9. (C) Comment: As a result of the July 8 TEG, the GOT is now fully aware of how important the forward deployed sensor is to the US. The Turks clearly had lingering concerns about ensuring coordination of the bilateral study with the NATO feasibility study and the related issue of common versus national funding. IMF-imposed fiscal discipline has made the defense budget tight.
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